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The Gourock-Dunoon question, EU Article 82 
and its implications for Scottish ferry services 
Neil Kay, Heriot-Watt University  
 
Abstract 
The Gourock-Dunoon question can be summarised as; how can fair competition and the 
public interest be pursued and preserved on ferry services between Gourock and Dunoon? 
It is a simple question but complicated by the existence of two operators on the route, one 
private and the other publicly owned.  The paper draws on this example to argue that the 
Scottish government policy of self-funding Scottish port authorities runs the danger of 
possible breaches of EU Article 82 and that this could impact adversely on other ferry 
services in Scotland.  The paper proposes solutions that could help alleviate these dangers.  
I Introduction and background 
A story, quite possibly apocryphal, is attributed to Benjamin Disraeli who reportedly claimed 
that only three people had ever understood the Schleswig-Holstein question.  One was dead, 
one was a professor who had gone mad, and the third was Disraeli himself who had quite 
forgotten the answer (Rowley-Conwy, 2006). 
7KH³*RXURFN-'XQRRQTXHVWLRQ´KDVSXUVXHGDQGIUXVWUDWHGDseries of transport ministers 
for coming up to four decades.  As far as is known, no-one has forgotten the answer or taken 
it to the grave with them. As to the mental state of this professor, I can only refer readers to 
the succession of transport ministers who received my submissions on this matter politely 
and patiently.  They are in a much better position to judge that issue than I am.   
The basic Gourock-Dunoon question can be expressed as; how can fair competition and the 
public interest be pursued and preserved on ferry services between Gourock and Dunoon?   
It is a question that can be phrased simply, but the issues surrounding it are far more complex 
and have wider significance for the whole Scottish ferry network.  We also need to consider 
why the problem may be important and relevant in the present context.  That consideration 
falls into two parts: economic significance, and significance in the context of the financing of 
the Scottish ferry services. We discuss these issues below.       
However, I also have four other analyses of Scottish ferry policy in general and Gourock-
Dunoon in particular previously published in this Commentary (Kay, 1999, 2009, 2010, 2011).  
All are available online so I will avoid trampling over old ground as far as possible though 
most of the arguments in these analyses are still as fresh today as when the articles were 
published.   
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I note in passing that I argued in invited evidence to the Scottish Parliament in 2005 that it 
would be possible to run Scottish ferry services as state owned services (and without the 
need for tendering) as long as they complied with EU law under the Altmark conditions (see 
Kay, 2009 and 2010).      
However, the then Scottish Executive rejected these arguments on the basis of civil servant 
advice insisting that the Altmark criteria were not applicable to ferry services in Scotland.  
The tendering process went ahead and in May 2008 the European Commission announced 
an investigation into alleged State aid for Scottish ferry services on the basis that it turns out 
Altmark was applicable to Scottish ferry services ± which, as I say, I had identified as an 
escape route from tendering but ZKLFK WKH6FRWWLVK([HFXWLYH¶VFLYLOVHUYDQWVKDGGHQLHG
existed.  In fact, the then European Transport Commissioner Jacques Barrot had already 
confirmed in 2007 that Altmark was indeed applicable to Scottish ferry services (Ross, 2015).    
More recently, reports suggest the Teckal exemption (BBC News, 2017) may mean that the 
CalMac network and other routes such as Gourock-Dunoon may be considered for provision 
by an in-house operator without the needs to tender.  It is also clear EU State aid and 
competition rules will still apply here, and we discuss below some of the devils hiding in the 
detail.  
The 2005-08 Altmark saga and its effects have been summarised by Ross (2015).  Whether 
the then Scottish Executive in 2005 could have fashioned an alternative to tendering under 
Altmark is a moot point ± it would have required a commitment on the part of those in charge, 
and a willingness and ability to leverage and work with external competences not available 
to them in-house.    
These issues still have relevance today, both in terms of substance but also in terms of 
process. There are echoes of the Altmark debate and outcome in the submissions I have 
made to Transport Scotland and the Scottish government on the issues below for more than 
three years. We shall start by looking at the economic significance of the Gourock-Dunoon 
route in the Scottish context  
II The economic significance of Gourock-Dunoon   
Gourock and Dunoon are two communities on the Firth of Clyde about 5 miles apart and with 
populations of about 11,000 and 13,000 respectively.  They are connected by two ferry 
services.  One is a subsidised town-centre to town-centre foot passenger service operated 
by Argyll Ferries, a subsidiary of publicly owned David MacBrayne. The other is a vehicle-
carrying service operated by private operator Western Ferries.  It is generally recognised and 
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accepted by interested parties that any future vehicle-carrying service on the town-centre to 
town-centre route would have to be unsubsidised given the proximity of the private operator 
Western Ferries  
Gourock and Dunoon have importance as local centres in their own right, but their real 
significance lies in the wider geographical context in which they are set.  In that respect they 
can be viewed as the mirror image of South Queensferry and North Queensferry on the Firth 
of Forth.  The two Queensferry communities served as crucial ferry hubs for road traffic up 
and down the east coast of Scotland until the completion of the Forth Road Bridge in 1964. 
The Gourock-Dunoon ferries today play strategic and economic roles similar to those of the 
road and rail bridges on the Firth of Forth, though of course the Clyde has lesser population 
densities to the north compared to the Forth. 
This importance is reflected in Scottish transport statistics.  The private operator on the 
Gourock-Dunoon route (Western Ferries) was the busiest in Scotland in terms of passengers 
and vehicles in 2014 when it carried 1,347,200 passengers, 590,000 cars and 37,900 
commercial vehicles and buses (Transport Scotland, 2015, p145).  In that same year, 
Caledonian MacBrayne had 46 per cent and Western Ferries 24 per cent of vehicle carryings 
QDWLRQZLGH LQ 6FRWODQG :HVWHUQ¶V VKDUH RI QDWLRQDO WUDIILF ZDV IXOO\ DWWULEXWDEOH WR LWV
carryings on the Gourock-Dunoon route alone (Transport Scotland, 2015, p144).  
The question we now turn to is; why is Gourock-Dunoon also significant in the current 
context?  The roots of what is turning out to be a present-day twist on the Gourock-Dunoon 
problem were laid in August 2012 when it was revealed that Transport Scotland had identified 
five routes in Scotland which could be considered for separate tender (in some quarters this 
was argued to be a step towards privatisation).  Four of these routes were used by CalMac: 
Ardrossan to Brodick, Wemyss Bay to Rothesay, Oban to Craignure, and Largs to Cumbrae. 
These four routes (and in turn the harbours served) consistently figure in Scottish Transport 
Statistics as high frequency traffic and collectively they represent a substantial proportion of 
the CalMac network whether measured by revenue or volume of traffic.  State-owned 
Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd (CMAL) owns the Oban, Brodick, Wemyss Bay, Largs and 
Cumbrae harbours. Argyll and Bute Council own the Rothesay and Craignure harbours.  
Ardrossan harbour is owned by Clydeport. When the plans to open up the bundle and tender 
these routes separately were made public in 2012 there were threats of strike action alleging 
lack of assurances on pensions and working conditions (Daily Record, 2012)    
It is not clear why Transport Scotland had intended to tender some frequently used CalMac 
services individually at this point, but the European Commission certainly in its various 
investigations of Scottish ferry services down the years has consistently made it clear that 
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these services had to be administered in ways that were consistent with EU State aid and 
competition rules, and the Commission also made clear they saw competitive tendering as 
the normal mechanism to achieve this. The Commission had also made clear (including in 
their 2008 State aid investigation) that bundling of routes as in the CalMac tender could run 
the danger of concealing anti-competitive and discriminatory behaviour.      
³«VRPHLQWHUHVWHGSDUWLHVDUHRIWKHYLHZWKDWWKe bundling of all routes, with the exception 
of the route between Gourock and Dunoon, unduly and significantly restrained competition 
GXULQJWKHWHQGHU«7KH&RPPLVVLRQZLOOQHHGWRDVVHVVWKHLPSDFWRIWKHEXQGOLQJRQWKH
tender procedure; if it were to conclude that such bundling was not justifiable, then the 
Commission would consider that the contract has not been awarded through a really open 
and non-GLVFULPLQDWRU\SXEOLFSURFXUHPHQWSURFHGXUH´&(&para 11) 
At the same time, various Scottish administrations down the years had emphasised their 
preference, and in some cases their intentions, to keep CalMac and its services under public 
ownership. But the problem for each successive Scottish administration over the past 17 
years is that you cannot guarantee continued public ownership of these services in perpetuity 
under fairly conducted competitive tendering.  It is simply not possible to square that circle.      
$ IHZPRQWKVDIWHU WKHSXEOLFDQQRXQFHPHQWRI7UDQVSRUW6FRWODQG¶VSODQV IRU WHQGHULQJ
selected routes separately, a new CMAL system of port charges were introduced in April 
2013.  As we note below, this has major implications for the current financing and governance 
debate in the context of EU State aid and competition rules.  
III The CMAL pricing system    
,Q'HFHPEHU7UDQVSRUW6FRWODQGSXEOLVKHGWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V6FRWWLVK)HUU\
Services: Ferries Plan (2013-2022) outlining its intentions over the next the next twenty 
years.  It included looking at self-funding for harbour authorities such that:   
³6HOI-funding would require each harbour authority (whether CMAL, independent harbour 
trusts, local authorities or private ports) to plan their forward investment and ensure that 
harbour dues (for all users, not just ferry operators) were set at a level that enabled funds for 
SODQQHGFDSLWDOZRUNVWREHEXLOWXSDQGRUIRUORDQVIRUVXFKZRUNVWREHSDLGRII´7UDQVSRUW
Scotland, 2012, p.11). 
From 1st April 2013, CMAL abandoned the pier dues discount scheme for frequent users and 
moved to a non-negotiable scheme in which the pier dues were directly proportionate to the 
usage of a pier.  The result was that the charges are more closely related to the fare box 
revenues of the ferry operator than they are to the costs of providing services of the port 
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operator and was consistent with &0$/¶V6WUDWHJLF3ODQ-2022 (CMAL 2012) which had 
WKH DPELWLRQ RI ³making ports and harbours self-IXQGLQJ´1. This was followed by another 
strategic plan (CMAL 2014) which did not mention self-funding as such but makes clear that 
CMAL was following the investment priorities set out in the Transport Scotland (2012) ferry 
plan - which of course was based around self-funding.   
In principle, self-funding can sound an innocuous and reasonable proposition.  However, as 
I have argued in a series of communications to CMAL and Transport Scotland since 
November 2013, there are sound reasons to argue that self-funding a harbour authorities 
network can almost inevitably lead to breaches of EU Article 82. The problem breaks down 
into two parts, harbour authority port revenue and harbour authority port costs.  We can 
demonstrate this with a simple illustrative case.  
An illustrative case 
Suppose we have a harbour authority with a small network of four ports, A, B, C and D each 
serving separate markets. The four ports each cost the harbour authority £1 million pounds 
a year to operate and maintain. All the ports are used by similar vehicle-carrying ferries and 
the same network-wide charge is payable each time a vessel arrives at any of the four ports.  
A, B and C ports all have the same amount of usage by ferries over the course of a year, but 
Port D is used five times more frequently than any one of the other ports. You adjust the 
network charge until the network is self-financing. What revenue will you get from each of the 
ports? 
The answer is £500,000 revenue for each of ports A, B and C, and £2.5million for Port D.  
The network-wide revenue of £4million is just enough to cover the network-wide costs of £4 
million23RUW$%DQG&V¶ ORVVHVDre cross-subsidised by Port Ds high frequency, high 
revenue ± and highly profitable - EXVLQHVV,QIDFW3RUW'¶VJURVVSURILWPDUJLQLV 
Established EU case law suggests that the starting point from the perspective of the 
application of EU Article 82 would be to look at Port D as a business in its own right. Two 
2004 cases CEC (2004a and b) looked at the issue of whether a port authority was indulging 
in unfair pricing practices under Article 82 of the EC Treaty which prohibits the abuse by one 
or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in substantial part 
                                                          
1 Both strategic plans were originally publicly available on the internet. But as of February 17th 2017 there was no 
PHQWLRQRIWKHPRQWKH&0$/ZHEVLWHSXEOLFDWLRQVSDJH7KHVHFWLRQWLWOHG³&RUSRUDWH3ODQDQG6WUDWHJLF3ODQ´MXVW
has a 3-year corporate plan which does not mention self-funding. Both strategic plans are available from me on request. 
2 ,QSUDFWLFHWKHSRUWDXWKRULW\ZRXOGOLNHO\EHDOORZHGWRPDNHD³UHDVRQDEOHSURILW´RYHUDQGDERYHFRYHULQJLWVFRVWV 
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RILW³$EXVH´ZRXOGDPRXQWWR³GLUHFWO\RULQGLUHFWO\LPSRVLQJXQIDLUSXUFKDVHRUVHOOLQJSULFHV
RUXQIDLUWUDGLQJFRQGLWLRQV´ 
It was determined that the relevant market was the market for the provision of port services 
and facilities in the specific port transporting passengers and/or vehicles on the route in 
question (CEC 2004a)  
Further, the cases based their definition of what could constitute excessive or unfair pricing 
on a European Court of Justice ruling which judged that the amount of excess could be 
determined by looking at the profit margin resulting from the difference between the selling 
price of the product in question and its cost of production.  
The Court also determined that whether a price charged was both excessive and unfair could 
be determined by looking whether the charge imposed was either unfair in itself or when 
compared to competing products.3 
If we refer back to our illustrative case above, any operator using Port D who wished to argue 
the case that the charges levied at Port D were both excessive and unfair would start by 
pointing to a profit margin of 150% being made by the port authority at that port, with the 
surpluses being used to prop up loss-making businesses at Ports A, B and C. 
It could be argued that Ports A, B and C should be maintained and their loss making 
supported for social reasons and the needs of local communities.  That point could be fully 
conceded by the user of Port D, but the counterargument would be that if there were public 
interest reasons for maintaining ports A, B and C, then they should be subsidised from the 
public purse, not cross-subsidised through arguably excessive and unfair charges on a user 
of Port D in the distinct and separate market served by Port D. 
In our illustrative case, highly profitable port activity is used by a self-funding harbour authority 
to support loss-making ports serving separate markets in the rest of its network. In the next 
section we look at whether these issues are likely to arise in a real world Scottish context, 
starting with CMAL.  
IV ,PSOLFDWLRQVRI&0$/¶VVHOI-funding pricing regime  
:HFRQVLGHUWKHOLNHO\SURILWDQGORVVLPSOLFDWLRQVRI&0$/¶VVHOI-funding regime by treating 
each port as serving a separate and distinct market and look at the revenue and cost 
considerations in turn.  
                                                          
3 The Commission issued a short summary by Lamalle et al (2004) on the implications of the rulings.  
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)LUVWRQ&0$/¶Vrevenue side, there are 24 CMAL-owned harbours including Gourock (which 
is used by Argyll Ferries passenger-only service).  However, Gourock alone has more 
sailings per year than the total sailings for ten of these other CMAL ports (Castlebay, Coll, 
Colonsay, Kennacraig, Kilchoan, Lochboisdale, Port Ellen, Tarbert, Tiree and Tobermory).4  
Just five of the CMAL ports (Gourock, Colintraive, Cumbrae, Largs, and Rhubodach) account 
for 61% of the sailings on the network.5 Clearly some ports would involve larger vessels and 
so higher access charges per sailings, but equally clearly this serves to illustrate the high 
degree of skewness in terms of usage at individual CMAL port facilities.6      
6HFRQG RQ &0$/¶V cost VLGH DOPRVW DOO &0$/¶V FRVWV DUH IL[HG FRVWV WKHUH DUH QR
significant variable cosWVDWWULEXWDEOHWRDFWXDOXVDJHRIWKHLUIDFLOLWLHV7KLVUHIOHFWV&0$/¶V
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDVDQDVVHWPDQDJHUIHUU\RSHUDWLRQVDUHWKHRSHUDWRU¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZLWK
the operator and its employees typically also responsible for managing sailings at piers.  The 
JHQHUDOSULQFLSOH LV WKDW WKHQDWXUHRI&0$/¶VEXVLQHVVDQG LWVUHPLWPHDQVDOPRVWDOO LWV
costs of providing services to users are fixed costs largely unaffected by frequency of sailings 
of volume of traffic from its ports and harbours, whether schedules are half-hourly, hourly, 
daily or weekly.  This is consistent with what the Commission found in its investigation of port 
charges under Article 82 in the cases brought by the ferry operators Scandlines and 
6XQGEXVVHUQHZKHUHLWVDLG³,WVKRXOGEHnoted that most of the costs of the port are fixed 
costs and that the variable costs (i.e. costs that would vary with the number of calls by the 
ferry operators or the number of passengers/vehicles transported on board the ferries) are 
PLQRU´&(&DS.27). 
This highly skewed nature of operator economic activity on the network combined with the 
(mostly) fixed costs of operating ports means that some ports would likely be highly profitable 
ZKLOHRWKHUVZRXOGEHPDMRUORVVPDNHUV&0$/¶VVHOI-financing regime means the latter 
would be largely financed by the former. This extreme skewness can be argued to be 
consistent with a prima facie case that the CMAL port pricing formula would almost inevitably 
lead to the issues under Article 82 as discussed in the previous section. In the next section 
we look at Gourock-Dunoon as example to see whether that would happen in practice.    
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Harbour access data supplied by CMAL for April 11 to March 2012 and published timetables.  The CMAL figures 
probably somewhat understate the frequency of the Gourock sailings, the more frequent the Argyll Ferries service only 
started in June 2011  
5 Ibid  
6 Scottish Transport Statistics indicates a similar pattern of highly skewed volumes in terms of vehicles and passengers 
carried through individual ports,  
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V The Gourock-'XQRRQPDUNHWDQG&0$/¶VV\VWHPRIFKDUJHV 
Gourock-Dunoon would be a useful indicative case simply on the basis of its economic 
importance. In addition, a recent Scottish Government commissioned MVA report (2013) on 
the route also gives precise measures for port charges that would be imposed for a vehicle-
passenger service using CMAL and council facilities, and detailed costs of port operation are 
available through different sources. It is also subject to separate tender, unlike the two largest 
tenders (Clyde and Hebrides and Northern Isles) whose routes are bundled.  
If excessive/unfair pricing can be argued here, then there are a number of CalMac routes 
using CMAL harbours which exhibit similar features to Gourock-Dunoon in terms of its being 
a high frequency and/or high value route.  These are the type of routes referred to above that 
were briefly considered for separate tender by Transport Scotland in 2012.   
The MVA report was commissioned to investigate whether a commercial (unsubsidised) 
vehicle-carrying service could be viable in the Gourock-Dunoon market where it would face 
competition from the unsubsidised operator, Western Ferries (the latter owns its own ports).  
As far as port revenues to the harbour authority are concerned, the MVA report calculated 
that a frequent (half-hourly) two vessel vehicle-passenger service between Gourock and 
Dunoon would face annual port charges of about £2m at Gourock and a slightly lower amount 
at Dunoon (the latter owned by Argyll and Bute Council).  However, that last figure has to be 
regarded as contingent since the Council has since been reviewing its harbour charge 
system for its extensive network of ports.  At the same time, it will be recalled that the Scottish 
Ferry Plan indicated that it expected self-funding to be adopted by most harbour authorities, 
including councils.  
As far as port costs for the harbour authority are concerned, the Scandlines and 
Sundbusserne cases (CEC, 2004a and b) cited the United Brands case and noted a number 
of methodologies in general and with specific reference to EU port charges to assess possible 
excessive pricing under EU Article 82.   I used three of these methodologies as alternative 
ways of assessing the costs to CMAL of running the port of Gourock, drawing on publicly 
available information, information provided by CMAL, and Freedom of Information requests.  
These methodologies produced a range of cost estimates, the highest of which was £650,000 
a year. Even if this top end estimate was adopted, it suggested a profit margin of over 200% 
for CMAL if a frequent vehicle-passenger service was to be reintroduced on the route.  The 
MVA figures suggested that these charges would severely impact on the net revenue stream 
and adversely affect the commercial risks for any operator wishing to enter this market with 
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a vehicle-carrying service. It could also arguably lead to breaches of Article 82, most 
obviously in deterring such market entry.         
By extension, these same issues should also apply to the high frequency/high value routes 
on the CalMac network where CMAL and Argyll and Bute Council are the dominant harbour 
authorities. We would expect that network charges imposed by the harbour authorities self-
funding their respective networks would reduce or eliminate the possibility of commercial 
unsubsidised vehicle carrying on these routes.  This in turn might diminish arguments that 
the CalMac network could be partially unbundled by selecting some routes for separate 
tender, such as the ones that were briefly considered for these purposes in 2012.   
I submitted my analysis in writing to the then Managing Director of CMAL and the leader of 
Argyll and Bute Council in November 2013, and since then have had meetings with the CMAL 
MD and his two successors.  However, to date these meetings have not led to any 
satisfactory conclusion.  Questions still relate to the object and the effect of harbour 
authorities self-funding regime under Article 82.  As to what its object was, we can grant good 
intentions and put down any adverse outcomes to unintended consequences.  But what 
matters here are the actual effects.  
These effects may be judged potentially severe under Article 82. Interested parties (which 
can include operators, local businesses and communities) may have grounds for claiming 
that the general impact RI6FRWWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\RIKDUERXUDXWKRULWLHVVHOI-funding is 
to lead to excessive port pricing on popular high value/frequency routes and protect existing 
Scottish ferry operators by unfairly deterring market entry from other EU operators.  The 
specific operators most obviously at risk of claims of unfair protection are CalMac Ferries, 
Argyll Ferries and Western Ferries (the latter two on the Gourock-Dunoon route). 
It might further be argued that CalMac route-bundling facilitates potential abuse of this nature 
by reducing the transparency of costs and revenue streams associated with each route 
market.  This is a non-trivial danger given (as noted above) the concerns expressed by the 
Commission down the years as to the potential market distortion effects of route bundling.      
Finally, it should be noted that in the view of some interested parties, the issue of excessive 
port charges may already have had an impact in deterring potential operators from pursuing 
an interest in the Gourock-Dunoon route after Expressions of Interest were invited recently 
by Transport Scotland.  
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VI Conclusions and possible remedies    
Notwithstanding the issues outlined above, there are some straightforward remedies that can 
± and should - EHDSSOLHGWRUHVROYHWKHLVVXHVUDLVHGE\WKH6FRWWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\
that port authorities in Scotland self-fund their port networks by way of cross-subsidies and 
the competition issues these raise under Article 82.  These remedies include that:  
(1) As a prerequisite, that these issues be recognised at ministerial level of the Scottish 
Government and that action needs to be taken to resolve them.  
(2) The Scottish Government should identify a well-established and generally accepted 
methodology to assess the cost of operating and maintaining individual ports 
(including accounting for shared overheads and costs).       
(3) The chosen methodology should be adopted to assess the individual costs of ports 
operated and maintained by those harbour authorities likely to be affected by the 
above issues. 
(4) The results should be made publicly available.  
(5) It would still be possible for harbour authorities like CMAL and Argyll and Bute Council 
to operate a network-wide system of port charges.  However, that system should 
incorporate an annual system of volume-dependent ex ante discounts or ex post 
rebates to ensure that the port authority makes no more than a reasonable profit at 
individual ports.    
(6) There are likely to be public interest arguments for supporting loss making ports from 
public funds for social reasons (as in our illustrative case above).    
There are two points that should be emphasised about switching from a self-funding port 
QHWZRUNSULFLQJUHJLPHWRDQµH[DQWHGLVFRXQWH[SRVWUHEDWH¶RQH)LUVWLWVDGRSWLRQPD\
not actually lead to pressure to unbundle high frequency/value routes.  Underlying profitability 
of any of such routes is certainly likely to have been eroded by the rise in costs associated 
with self-funding regimes, but their profitability is also likely to have been squeezed from the 
other direction by the imposition of Road Equivalent Tariff (RET) on route revenue streams. 
However, while it has been argued here that self-funding leads to questionable outcomes 
under Article 82, RET has been applied to these routes for well-articulated and legitimate 
social reasons.  That being the case, these routes may still be commercially unprofitable 
even after a fair system of port charges is set up.  
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Second, the irony is that harbour-DXWKRULWLHV¶VHOI-funding is unlikely to have any significant 
net effect on the public purse, either compared to systems past or the one proposed here. 
The major impact of self-funding is that any increased port revenue to CMAL (and any other 
port authority) in terms of increased port charges just has to be met in the form of increased 
subsidy at these ports for CalMac to enable it to continue its scheduled and contracted 
operations (effectively tapping publicly-owned Peter to pay publicly-owned Paul).  Indeed if 
the potential losses in harbour fees from deterring a potential vehicle service at Gourock-
Dunoon are factored in, self-funding could actually lead to a net loss to the public purse.              
Finally, I am optimistic in principle that simple solutions compliant with EU law could be 
applied here and move things forward to a solution to the Gourock-Dunoon question.  I am 
however a realist (based on some years of experience), and in practice we can expect this 
µFDQ¶ WREHNLFNHGGRZQ WKH URDGXQWLO WKHSRWHQWLDOSUREOHPVZDUQHGDERXWKHUHEHFRPH
actual problems.        
 
Author details 
Professor Neil Kay,  
Edinburgh Business School,  
Heriot-Watt University 
nk@ebs.hw.ac.uk 
 
References 
(Note: all online links below were accessible as of 17 February 2017)  
BBC News (2017) Scottish ferry services 'could be nationalised', BBC online 2nd February 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-38838230 ) 
CEC (2008) State aid C 16/08 (ex NN 35/07 and NN 105/05); Subsidies to CalMac and 
NorthLink for maritime transport services in Scotland http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:126:0016:0042:EN:PDF 
CEC (2004a) Case COMP/A.36.568/D3, Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/36568/36568_44_4.pdf 
CEC (2004b) Case COMP/A.36.570/D3, Sundbusserne v Port of Helsingborg 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/36570/36570_39_5.pdf 
CMAL (2012) Strategic Plan 2012-2022, Gourock, CMAL.  
CMAL (2014) Strategic Plan 2014-2024, Gourock, CMAL. 
Daily Record (2012) Ferry workers ballot on possible strike action over services being 
privatised 1st August (http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/calmac-ferry-
workers-could-strike-1200496  
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, March 2017  
12 
 
Kay, N. M. (1999) Sustainable competition? Ferries and competition on the Clyde. Fraser of 
Allander Economic Commentary, 24 (3). pp. 52-61 (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/52624/   
Kay N. M. (2009) Scottish Ferry Policy. Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary 32 (3) 
pp. 46-58 
(http://www.strath.ac.uk/media/departments/economics/fairse/backissues/Fraser_of_Alland
er_Economic_Commentary_Vol_32,_No_3[1].pdf   
Kay, N. M. (2010) Scottish ferry policy and the Commission decision Fraser of Allander 
Economic Commentary 33 (3) 61-66 
(https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/30699112/FEC_33_3_2010_KayN.pdf   
Kay, N. M. (2011) The governance of Scottish ferry services. Fraser of Allander Economic 
Commentary, 35 (1). pp. 46-52. ISSN 2046-5378 (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/46850/   
Lamalle, M, Lindstrom-Rossi, L., and A. C. Teixeirae (2004) Two important rejection 
decisions on excessive pricing in the port sector, Competition Policy Newsletter, Brussels, 
European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2004_3_40.pdf 
MVA (2013) Gourock-Dunoon Ferry Service ± Feasibility Study of a Future Passenger and 
Vehicle Service with the Vehicle Portion being non-Subsidised: Final Report for Transport 
Scotland, MVA Consultancy.   
Ross, D. (2015) Inside Track: Folly of failing to listen to ferry tendering alternatives, The 
Herald, 8th July 2015, see https://www.pressreader.com/uk/the-
herald/20150708/281968901355218  
Rowley-Conwy, P. (2006). The Concept of Prehistory and the Invention of the Terms 
Prehistoric' and Prehistorian': the Scandinavian Origin, 1833²1850. European Journal of 
Archaeology, 9(1), 103-130. 
Transport Scotland (2012) Scottish Ferry Services: Ferries Plan (2013-2022), Glasgow, 
Transport Scotland. 
(http://www.transport.gov.scot/sites/default/files/documents/rrd_reports/uploaded_reports/j2
54579/j254579.pdf  
Transport Scotland (2015) Scottish Transport Statistics, National Statistics publication No. 
34,  Glasgow, Transport Scotland. 
(http://www.transport.gov.scot/sites/default/files/documents/rrd_reports/uploaded_reports/j4
15388/j415388.pdf 
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, March 2017  
13 
 
 
 
